Promoting cooperation between different groups remains one of society's biggest challenges. We examine whether such intergroup cooperation can be fostered through observation by in-group leaders, using a lab-in-the-field experiment in Papua New Guinea. The effect of in-group observation is not clear ex ante, as individuals may both want to show themselves as cooperative ('cooperation motivation') and show that they prioritize their own group, for example, by only cooperating with members of their own group and not with others ('favoritism motivation'). We find that the cooperation motivation is stronger. Observation by the in-group leader increases the share of people who cooperate with members of other communities from 17 percent to 70 percent, thereby eliminating the in-group bias in cooperation. We relate this finding to a shared understanding among participants that intergroup cooperation is socially desirable. Our findings suggest that policymakers, communities, and organizations may leverage in-group observation to improve intergroup cooperation.
People are often motivated to act in a way that sends a favourable signal about their character. This paper proposes a separation of signalling into its direct and indirect components. An observed behaviour can influence a person's image directly when the behaviour itself is image-relevant, and it can influence a person's image indirectly by changing people's beliefs about an unobserved, image-relevant behaviour. In an experiment on charitable giving, we show that individuals engage in indirect signalling to make an altruistic bluff. Donors engage in an image-irrelevant behaviour (donating to many charities) to change observers' beliefs about an unobserved, image-relevant behaviour (donating large amounts). This bluff works, as it leads observers to form beliefs that are positively biased.
In many countries, partisans have become increasingly biased in how they evaluate others based on political affiliation. We suggest that this increase in affective polarization may in part be caused by changes in the global power distribution which caused many countries to experience a long period without external (military) threats. To study the importance of external threats, we conduct a priming experiment to examine how making Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 salient causally influences affective polarization and collaboration in the U.S. We find that priming Americans with Russia's military aggression leads to a modest reduction in affective polarization and an increase in cooperativeness as measured by behavior in an incentivized coordination game. Surprisingly, the effect of making Russia's invasion salient does not depend on perceived cross-party disagreement about the conflict. These results suggest that researchers should also consider international relations to understand within-country polarization and willingness to collaborate.
Income and wealth grow over time, and this leads to changes in the level of inequality in a society. Yet, a large literature in cognitive psychology suggests that individuals often struggle to understand the effect of exponential growth. Misunderstanding how growth influences inequality may lead to biased preferences for policies with long-term effects, from taxation to investments in education. In an incentivised experiment, I examine (i) whether individuals are able to predict how exponential economic growth influences inequality, and (ii) whether informing individuals about the actual development in inequality influences their preferences for redistribution. I find that most people underestimate how much inequality increases in the presence of growth. However, informing individuals about the actual development in inequality does not affect their preferences for redistribution. Rather, what matters is whether people know if redistribution will come at a personal cost to themselves.